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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
CaseNo.960721-CA

v.

JANA WESTERMAN,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal because it is taken from a final order of a
criminal case in a court of record. §78-2a-3(e) Utah Code Annotated (UCA). The defendant/
appellant appeals from the order of restitution issued by the Honorable Stephen L. Henriod of
Division II of the Third Judicial District Court.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES, STANDARD OF REVIEW
AND PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUES
The defendant/appellant frames the issue as whether the trial court abused its discretion by
ordering restitution in the amount $3 8,643.59. The component arguments forwarded by the
defendant raise these issues: (1) Did the trial court commit error as a matter of law in ordering
restitution incident to a conviction for driving while under the influence of alcohol?; (2) May an
insurance company be a "victim" for purposes of UCA §76-3-201, and therefore be awarded
restitution?; and (3) Must a valid restitution order recite reasoning touching upon each statutory
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criteria set forth at UCA §76-3-201(8)? These issues concern questions of law which are reviewed
for correctness. State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991). However, "[ujnless a trial court
exceeds the authority prescribed by law or abuses its discretion, we will not disturb its order of
restitution. State v. Twitchell, 832 P.2d 866, 868 (Utah App. 1992). At the restitution hearing
conducted by the trial court on October 21,1996, the defendant did preserve the issues of whether it
is within the trial court's discretion to order restitution incident to a DUI conviction, and whether an
insurance company may be considered a victim to whom restitution may be ordered. Transcript of
Restitution Hearing at page 7. The defendant did not, however, argue below that the trial court
erred by failing to articulate its reasoning in support of the restitution order.
STATUTORY PRO VISIONS
Utah Code Annotated § 76-3 -201, governs restitution as a component of a sentence imposed
incident to a criminal conviction. In relevant part, it provides:
(4) (a) (i) When a person is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in pecuniary
damages, in addition to any other sentence it may impose, the court shall order that
the defendant make restitution to victims of crime as provided in this subsection...
For purposes of restitution, a victim has the same meaning as defined in Section 7738-2...
(ii) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court shall follow the
criteria and procedures as provided in Sections (4)(c) and (4)(d).
(c) In determining restitution, the court shall determine complete restitution and courtordered restitution.
(i) Complete restitution means the restitution necessary to compensate the victim
for all losses caused by the defendant.
(ii) Court-orderedrestitution means the restitution the court having criminal
jurisdiction orders the defendant to pay as part of the criminal sentence at the time
of sentencing
(iii) Complete restitution and court-ordered restitution shall be determined as
provided in Subsection (8).
(d) (i) If the court determines that restitution is appropriate or inappropriate under this
subsection, the court shall make the reasons for the decision a part of the record.
2

(8) (a) For the purpose of determining restitution for an offense, the offense shall include
any criminal conduct admitted by the defendant to the sentencing court...
(b) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for complete restitution, the
court shall consider all relevant facts, including:
(i) the cost of the damage or loss if the offense resulted in damage to or loss or
destruction of property of a victim of the offense;
(ii) the cost of necessary medical and related professional services...
(c) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for court-ordered probation,
the court shall consider the factors listed in Subsection (b) and:
(i) the financial resources of the defendant and the burden the payment of
restitution will impose, with regard to the other obligations of the defendant;
(ii) the ability of the defendantto pay restitution on an installment basis or on
other conditions to be fixed by the court;
(iii) the rehabilitate effect on the defendant of the payment of restitution and the
method of payment; and
(iv) other circumstances which the court determines make restitution
inappropriate.
(d) The court may decline to make an order or may defer entering an order of
restitution if the court determines that the complication and prolongation of the
sentencing process, as the result of considering an order of restitution under this
subsection, substantially outweighs the need to provide restitution to the victim.
Utah Code Annotated §76-3-201.
The following statutory excerpts are also relevant to the resolution of this appeal:
The department may not reinstate any license suspended or revoked as a result of
the conviction [of driving while under the influence], until the convicted person has
furnished evidence satisfactory to the department that: ...all fines and fees including
fees for restitution and rehabilitation costs assessed against the person have been
paidUtah Code Annotated §4 l-6-44(7)(b)(ii)(emphasis added).
When a defendant sentenced to pay a fine or to make restitution defaults in the
payment of any installment, the court on motion of the prosecution, victim, or upon
its own motion may require [her] to show cause why [her] default should not be
treated as contempt of court.
Unless the defendant shows that [her] default was not attributable to an intentional
refusal to obey the order of the court or to a failure on [her] part to make a good
faith effort to make the payment, the court may find that the default constitutes
3

contempt and may order [her] committed until the fine or restitution, or a specified
part of it, is paid.
Utah Code Annotated §76-3-201.l(l)and (2).
"Victim of a crime" means any person against whom the charged crime or conduct
is alleged to have been perpetrated or attempted by the defendant.. .unlessthe natural
person is the accused...or criminally involved in the crime...
Utah Code Annotated §77-38-2(9)(a)(3).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The information in this case charged, inter alia, a class A misdemeanor in that on or about
February 14,1996, Jana Westerman operated a motor vehicle while she was under the influence of
alcohol, or the combined influence of alcohol and any drug, to a degree which rendered her
incapable of safely operating the vehicle, and that as a result of her having operated the vehicle in
an unsafe manner she caused injury to another. Information for case number 965007611 TC. The
probable cause statement in that information more specifically proffered that the defendant caused
an accident with a vehicle wherein the defendant pulled out of a parking lot into a roadway and hit a
car that had been traveling along the roadway. Id. On August 14,1996, Ms. Westerman pled
guilty to driving under the influence of alcohol after the charge was amended to be treated as a class
B misdemeanor. In comments to the trial court at her sentencing hearing, Ms. Westerman's
counsel, Mr. Nielsen, explained that the collision occurred when Ms. Westerman's car "...had
stalled and was rolling out of a parking lot as it struck a vehicle coming out of the roadway."
Sentencing Transcript, at page 7.
During the sentencing hearing, the defendant, through counsel, urged the trial court to
impose as restitution only the amount $500.00, as had been recommended in the pre-sentence
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report, which would reimburse the victim for her insurance deductible. Id., at page 2. Mr. Nielsen
noted on behalf of the defendant that she was temporarily unemployed, having voluntarily quit her
employment to stay home with her children (ages 20,18, and 12), and that she was making efforts
to return to work. Id., at page 4. Mr. Nielsen then argued that it would take the defendant years to
pay full restitution. Id., at page 5. The trial court rejected the defendant's argument for the
imposition of partial restitution, and ordered her to pay complete restitution totaling $38,643.59.
Id., at page 8. During the sentencing hearing, the court explained that it intended to order full
restitution because it would be inequitable for any party to forego recovery for the harm caused by
the defendant's drunken driving, or to incur additional expense in obtaining a judgment. Id., at
pages 4-5. During further discussion with counsel, the trial court acknowledged that it might take
the defendant "the rest of her life" to pay full restitution, and accordingly the defendant was ordered
to make payments of $ 100 per month with the expectation that the balance of unpaid restitution
would be converted to a civil judgment upon the termination of her probation. Id., at page 9. The
sentencing was then concluded with the understanding that the defendant could have a further
hearing on the issue of restitutionif she wished. Id., at page 10.
On October 21,1996, a restitution hearing was convened at the defendant' s request. At that
hearing, the State proffered documentation in support of the finding that the financial impact of the
crime amounted to $38,643.59 based on the amounts being paid by the victim and her insurance
company. RestitutionTranscript,atpage3. Mr. Nielsen (appearing on behalf of the defendant,
who chose not to attend the hearing), then questioned the reliability of the estimates upon which the
insurance company was prepared to pay, but offered no evidence supporting a claim that the figure
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presented by the State did not accurately reflect the actual costs. Id., at page 5. Mr. Nielsen also
argued that the holding in State v. Robinson should be applied to bar the award of restitution
arisingfromthe conviction for DUI, but he made no argument that the defendant's operation of her
vehicle was not the proximate cause of the damages, or that she was being denied the opportunity to
present any meritorious defense against liability that would otherwise be available to her in a
separate civil proceeding. Id., at page 7. The trial court again declined to order less than complete
restitution.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The defendant misapprehends the holding in State v. Robinson, 860 P.2d 979 (Utah App.
1993), when she asserts that the trial court was without authority to order restitution for damages
arisingfroma DUI-related accident: Robinson does not hold that restitution may never be ordered
in traffic-related cases, nor does it hold that restitution is generally inappropriate for damages
caused by drunk drivers, and the defendant has not made out a due process challenge in any event.
The defendant also misapprehends the meaning of "victim" for purposes of the restitution statute as
not pertaining to an insurance company—the defendant's assertion has been expressly rej ected by
the Utah Supreme Court. Finally, the defendant is incorrect in asserting that the this Court should

1

State v. Robinson, 860 P.2d 979,983 (Utah App. 1993), cert denied, 878 P.2d 1154 (1994).
The defendant presents her argument that the trial court erred in awarding restitution to an insurance company,
which she insists is not a "victim" for purposes of the restitution statute, without bringing to the Court's attention the
holding in State v. Stayer, 706 P.2d 611 (Utah 1985). Stayer addressed exactly this issue, and noting the "victim" is
a person who has suffered pecuniary damage, and that a "person" may be an individual, a public or private
corporation, a government, a partnership, or an unincorporated association (citing UCA §76-1-601(5)), the court
held that a trial court may properly order restitution to an insurance company to whom a right of recovery has been
assigned. Id., at 613. Because Stayer is controlling authority, the State will not address this issue further.
6
2

reach the unpreserved challenge to the trial court's findings, and anyway incorrectly asserts that the
trial court failed to consider the statutory criteria set forth to guide orders of restitution.
ARGUMENT
I. Robinson does not Prohibit Restitution in all Traffic Offenses,
The principal argument in the defendant's appeal rests on the this statement by this court in
Statev. Robinson, 860 P.2d 979,983 (UtahApp. 1993): "...a restitution order will generally be
inappropriate in a matter arising from a traffic violation that involved only negligence, and not
criminal intent." Brief of Appellant, at page 9. Apparently, the defendant construes this statement
to mean that as a matter of law, the ordering of restitution for driving-related criminal conduct
constitutes a denial of due process of law. The State asserts that Robinson does not lend itself to
such a bright line rule, but rather Robinson notes that restitution will generally be inappropriate in
traffic cases, and Robinson addresses whether restitution was appropriate in a specific factual
situation. The facts in Robinson are that the defendant was involved in a traffic accident wherein he
collided with a motorcycle while changing lanes, that he failed to remain at the scene of the
accident, and that he pled guilty to the crimes of improper lane change and failure to remain at the
scene of an accident while insisting that he was ".. .not convinced that the accident was [his] fault."
Id., at 980,983. Applying these facts to the articulation that "...an order of restitution will generally
be inappropriate in a matter arising from a traffic violation that involves only negligence... [because]
[restitutionshould only be ordered in cases where liability is clear..." id. (emphasis added),
Robinson cannot be read to mean that restitution is inappropriate even when there is no controversy
whether the defendant's conduct was the proximate cause of injury.
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II. Restitution is not Inappropriate in DUI Cases.
Restitution is specifically contemplated by the Legislature in DUI cases. Pursuant to UCA
§41 -6-44(7)(b)(ii), the Legislature has provided that until restitution has been paid in full, the
Department of Public Safety may not reinstate a person's driver's license.3 The distinct treatment
of driving while intoxicated from other less-culpable conduct arising out of the operation of motor
vehicles is likewise noted in Robinson, where this Court recognized that although victims from
traffic accidents are generally not eligible for payments from the quasi-restitutionary Crime
Victim's Reparations Fund, an exceptionis made for driving conduct that "...(i) causes personal
injury or death with criminal intent; or (ii) constitutes the offense of driving while under the
influence of alcohol..." Id., at note 8 (citing UCA §63-63-2(9)(b)~since renumbered as UCA §6325a-402(9)(b)). Similarly, the view that driving while under the influence of alcohol amounts to
criminal negligence, and not mere carelessness nor simple negligence, has long been recognized by
Utah courts. See State v. Capps, 176 P.2d 873 (Utah 1947), State v. Ruben, 663 P.2d 445 (Utah
1983). Given that this Court noted in Robinson essentially the same distinction between drunk
driving and other driving conduct that is expressly recognized in UCA §41 -6-44, and is likewise
recognized in caselaw, and given that the reason for this distinction is because drunken driving
involves a culpable assumption of risk rather than mere carelessness or simple negligence,

3

Although this portion of the statute pertains only to persons whose license has been suspended or revoked for a
second or subsequent DUI, this distinction does not detractfromthe fact that the Legislature expected that the
payment of restitution would be ordered in DUI cases.
In Capps, the Utah Supreme Court considered an appealfroma conviction for involuntary manslaughter, and held
that driving a vehicle while intoxicated to the point of slurred speech and staggered gait is conduct that amounts to
criminal negligence. Capps, 167P.2d at 874. In Ruben, the Court considered whether punitive damages may be
awarded against a defendant who drove while intoxicated, and cited Capps favorably in support of the proposition that
drunkenness is properly considered as a factor in assessing whether a defendant has acted with criminal negligence
because drunkenness indicates Recklessness and a marked disregard for the safety of others." Ruben, 663 P.2dat449.
8

Robinson's general rule against restitution for non-culpable conduct has no application to drunken
driving cases.

III. This Defendant is not Treated Unfairly by the Award of Restitution.
Unlike in Robinson, where the defendant voiced concern to the trial court about issues such
as proximate cause and other defenses, the defendant in this case has not been heard to complain
that the amount of restitution is inappropriate because the other driver shared fault, nor has she
raised any other issue or defense upon which the trial court should have found it inappropriate to
order restitution. Instead of placing any facts in issue during the sentencing process—and thereby
affording the State the opportunity to respond, the defendant has rested her argument on the brightline construction she attributes to Robinson. She has failed to cast the facts of this case in any light
that shows she is unjustly ordered to pay damages that resulted from her drunken driving.
Accordingly, unless the defendant is correct in her supposition that restitution may never be ordered
upon a conviction for DUI, she has preserved no claim that due process is denied in this case.

IV. The Defendant Preserved to Challenge to the Trial Court's Findings.
In her remaining point of argument, the defendant raises for the first time on appeal the
complaint that the trial court did not adequately state for the record its reasoning in support of its
restitution order. The defendant insists that this Court may reach this issue even though not argued

5

To avoid misunderstanding, the State does not assert that restitution will be appropriate in every case where an
impaired driver is involved in an accident. The circumstance is easily imagined where a person driving a car while
impaired, but who at the same time is obeying the speed limit and is respecting the rights-of-way of others, is hit due
to the negligence of another driver. It is this type of complicating factor for which the trial court may elect,
pursuant to UCA §76-3-20 l(8)(d), to decline an order of restitution to avoid the unnecessary prolongation of the
sentencing process. Conversely, it is because no such complicating factors were present in this case that there was
no reason for the trial court to eschew the statutory prescription that restitution shall be ordered.
9

below because UCA §76-3-201 (4)(d)(i)directs the trial court to articulate is reasons for
determining that restitution is appropriate or inappropriate, and therefore the alleged failure of the
trial court constitutes plain error. This Court may reach this issue under the plain error doctrine if
the error should have been obvious to the trial court and if the error was extremely harmful. State
v. Labrum, 925 P.2d 937 (Utah 1996). In support of her plain error argument, the defendant relies
on Labrum, where the trial court was found to have erred by failing to make written findings in
support of a gang enhancement. Labrum is distinguishable from this case. The Court in Labrum
reasoned that the imposition of gang enhancement penalties without written findings was extremely
harmful because gang enhancements are predicated by statute on very specific factual findings, and
because the trial court was on notice based on the prior holding in State v. Nelson, 725 P.2d 1353
(Utah 1986) that it was plain error to omit such written findings. Id., at 939-40. Unlike in Labrum,
the statute governing orders of restitution does not require written findings, nor does it require
specific factual findings as a predicate to an order of restitution, and it raises a presumption
favoring the order of restitution. UC A §76-3 -201 (4)(a)(i).6 Additionally, Utah precedent teaches
that a restitution order will be presumed valid if the facts before the trial court could support an
order of restitution. State v. Stayer, 706 P.2d 611,614 (Utah 1985). Given the presumption
favoring the imposition of restitution orders, and the presumption that restitution orders are valid
unless unsupported by the record, the defendant has failed to show harmful error and this Court
should reject the defendant's plain error argument.

"When a person is convicted for criminal activity that has resulted in pecuniary damages...the court shall order
that the defendant make restitution to the victims..." UCA §76-3-201(4)(a)(i) (emphasis added).
10

V. The Trial Court Properly Articulated Reasoning
Supporting the Restitution Order.
Even should the Court find it appropriate to reach this issue, the Court will find that the trial
court did adequately express its reasoning in support of its restitution order. The first question in
addressing this claim is: What findings must be entered into the record pursuant to the relevant
statute? The pertinent passage states: "If the court determines that restitution is appropriate or
inappropriate under this subsection, the court shall make the reasons for the decision a part of the
record." UCA §76-3-201 (4)(d)(i)(emphasis added). The subsection to which this passage refers,
paragraph (4) of UCA §76-3-201, provides that the court shall order the defendantto make
restitution to the victim, that the court may order the defendant to pay for costs incurred in
extradition, and that the court shall determine complete restitution and court ordered restitution.
UCA §76-3-201 (4). Accordingly, paragraph (4)(d)(i) applies in this case to mean that the trial court
was obliged, in order to support its determination that restitution was appropriate, to state for the
record why it chose to order complete restitution, rather than some lesser amount. The trial court
did this by noting that the victims should not be further victimized by having to expend additional
resources toward obtaining and enforcing a judgment against the defendant to make themselves
financially whole from the damage caused by the defendant. Sentencing Transcript, at page 4. The
trial court further explained that restitution was ordered in the amount $38,643.59 because, absent
any evidence to the contrary from the defendant, this amount was uncontroverted and supported by
documentation submitted by the State. Restitution Hearing Transcript, at page 6. Because the issue
of extradition costs was moot, the trial court complied completely with the findings requirement of
UCA §76-3-201 (4)(d)(i)by finding that restitution was appropriate, that total restitution amounted
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to $38,643.59, and that the amount of Court ordered restitution would be no less than complete
restitution.
The defendant apparently reads the findings requirement in UCA §76-3-201 (4)(d)(i)to
apply not only to that subsection, but would have this Court apply the requirement to oblige trial
courts to engage in a soliloquy touching upon each factor listed in paragraphs (8)(b) and (8)(c) of
UCA §76-3-201 every time restitutionis ordered, irrespectiveof whether the factors are relevant to
the court' s determination of appropriateness or inappropriateness of restitution. Specifically, the
defendant assails the order of restitution in this case because (1) she believes the trial court ignored
the fact that she would not likely pay full restitution before the end of her period of probation, and
(2) because the trial court did not state that restitution was calculated toward her rehabilitation. As
to the first point, the defendant presents this argument while acknowledging that payments were
ordered at only $ 100.00 per month, and she cites no authority suggesting that restitution must be
ordered in no greater amount than can be fully paid during the period of probation. Absent such
authority, the trial court cannot be found in error for exercising its discretion to make the defendant,
rather than the victims or society, responsible for the whole of the damages she caused.
As to the second point, while the defendant is accurate in noting that the trial court did not
discuss the rehabilitative effect of restitution, the defendant has likewise presented no discussion,
either here or to the trial court, of why her payment of restitution is likely to be detrimental to her
rehabilitation. As was noted in State v. Twitchell, a court's restitutive formula does not fail for

Anticipating that the defendant may respond by arguing that an order of restitution in an amount not easily paid
unreasonably subjects her to the risk of being found in violation of her probation, the State notes that a defendant
need only show that she has made a continuing good faith effort to pay restitution to avoid the court's contempt
power. UCA §76-3-201.1(2).
12

taking into account punitive purposes instead of exclusively considering the defendant's
rehabilitation. Twitchell, 832 P.2d 866,869 (Utah App. 1992). As was also noted in Twitchell, an
order of restitution is presumed to have a rehabilitative effect because "...there is a strong feeling
that if the offender is made to suffer a loss and pay for the responsibility of the loss [she] caused,
there is a greater likelihood [she'll] not do it again." Id. (quoting State v. Dillon, 637 P.2d 602
(Ore. 1981)). Thus, absent some explanation why concerns of rehabilitation mandate that less-thancomplete-restitutionbe ordered, the defendant has not shown that the trial court abused its
discretion in this restitution order.
CONCLUSION
The defendant inappropriately attributes to State v. Robinson the bright line rule that
restitution may not be ordered for any driving-related criminal conduct. Dictum in Robinson
notwithstanding, a defendant is not denied due process by an order of restitution where no question
of liability is present. The defendant has not placed the finding of her liability at issue in this casewhere she pled guilty to driving drunk and admitted she pulled into the path of another vehicle—and
she has made no claim that would shift any of the liability away from her criminally negligent
conduct. The defendant has likewise preserved no complaint regarding the adequacy of the trial
court's reasons for refusing to order less than complete restitution. Accordingly, the trial court' s
order for the payment of full restitution is proper, and should not be disturbed.
Respectfully submitted this j ^ a a y of May, 1997.
E.NEALGUNNARSON
Salt Lake District Attefrney, by
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STEPHEN MERCER,
Deputy District Attorney
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